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We extend a recently introduced approach to the positive problem of game the-
ory, Predictive Game Theory (PGT Wolpert (2008)). In PGT, modeling a game
results in a probability distribution over possible behavior pro¯les. This contrasts
with the conventional approach where modeling a game results in an equilibrium
set of possible behavior pro¯les. We analyze three PGT models. Two of these are
based on the well-known quantal response and epsilon equilibrium concepts, while
the third is entirely new to the economics literature. We use a Cournot game to
demonstrate how to use our extension of PGT, concentrating on model combina-
tion, modeler uncertainty, and mechanism design. In particular, we emphasize how
PGT allows a modeler to perform prediction and mechanism design in a manner
that is fully consistent with decision theory. We do this even in situations where
conventional approaches yield multiple equilibria, an ability that is necessary for a
fully decision theoretic mechanism design. Where possible, PGT results are com-
pared against equilibrium set analogs.
We would like to thank George Judge, Julian Jamison, Alan Isaac and audience members at the
American University Economics Seminar.
11 Introduction
Predictive Game Theory (PGT), as ¯rst described in Wolpert (2008), is the practice of
using what is known about a strategic situation, including utility information, player ra-
tionality, focal points, symmetry, equality, player honesty, etc., to formulate a probability
distribution over all possible behaviors1. This distribution re°ects the uncertainty that
the external modeler of the strategic situation has about that situation. It is distinct
from the uncertainty of the participants in that situation. For example, players in a non-
cooperative game might know one another's utility functions, while the modeler does not.
Conversely, the modeler might know those utility functions, while the players do not.
Whereas conventional game theory modeling produces a set of possible behaviors,
PGT produces a full distribution over possible behaviors. Wolpert suggests a general
Bayesian form for such a modeler's probability distribution over all possible behaviors. In
this paper, we consider three statistical models that fall under that general Bayesian form.
Two of these models are based on the well-known conventional game theory concepts
of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) [see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)] and epsilon
equilibrium [see Radner (1980)], while the third comes from the multi-agent systems
literature [see Wolpert (2003)].
In this paper we develop these models, demonstrate their properties and discuss com-
putational methods for their implementation. Using the example of a Cournot duopoly,
we illustrate how PGT seamlessly incorporates modeler uncertainty about utilities, ra-
tionalities or other aspects of the game. This allows PGT to model aspects of strategic
situations that conventional approaches cannot consider, e.g., the relative probabilities of
multiple Nash Equilibria (NE) in a given game, and therefore the relative probabilities
of the social welfare values associated with those NE. We demonstrate how this allows
a modeler to use PGT to perform prediction and mechanism design in a manner that
is fully consistent with decision theory. We do this even in situations where conven-
tional approaches yield multiple equilibria, an ability that is necessary for a fully decision
theoretic mechanism design.
In the remainder of this section we motivate and describe the PGT approach in broad
terms. We then present a roadmap of the rest of the paper.
1By \all possible behavior" we mean all possible choice pro¯les. If players can only choose pure
strategies, it means all possible pure strategy pro¯les, while if they can randomize, it means all mixed
strategy pro¯les
21.1 The predictive game theory approach
The traditional game theoretic approach to prediction is to choose some best-response
equilibrium concept that is appropriate for the scenario in question (e.g., Nash Equi-
librium in Nash (1959), Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Harsanyi (1967), Markov Perfect
Equilibrium in Maskin and Tirole (1988) or Fairness Equilibrium in Rabin (1993)). How-
ever, research in behavioral game theory, particularly in empirical studies, suggests that
players are boundedly rational [see Arthur (1994); Conlisk (1996)].
With bounded rationality in mind, McKelvey and Palfrey developed the Quantal Re-
sponse Equilibrium (QRE) to provide predictions based on the concept of better-responses
rather than best-responses.
However all such predictions of behavior are point predictions, in that they pre-
dict the exact randomization each agent will use, and they assign probability zero to
all other randomizations. (In addition to equilibrium concepts like the NE and QRE
concepts, this is also true for \strategic thinking" concepts like Level-k-level thinking
[see Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006)] or cognitive hierarchy models [see Camerer et al.
(2006)].) The situation is not as extreme with set-valued equilibrium concepts, like the
epsilon equilibrium of Radner. However even these concepts do not provide a probability
distribution over all possible behavior pro¯les. In particular, they do not give relative
probabilities of the behavior pro¯les in the equilibrium sets they predict. They also
implicitly maintain that all are other behaviors have probability zero, in manifest contra-
diction to the real world, where any behavior can occur with some non-zero probability.
If one wishes to predict some characteristic of interest y concerning some physical
system, based on some information I concerning the system, then statistics provides
many ways to convert such a I into a probability distribution over y. A priori, there
is no reason that this standard approach to predicting the behavior of physical systems
is not appropriate when the physical system in question is some human beings playing a
game. PGT is just that standard statistical approach to prediction applied to situations
where human beings are playing a game. The characteristic of interest, y, can be anything
from a mixed strategy pro¯le q to social welfare w(q). In this paper, we generally regard
I as information about player utility functions and about player rationalities.
The Bayesian PGT approach starts with a prior distribution over behavior pro¯les.
This prior quanti¯es the modeler's beliefs about the relative probabilities of di®erent
mixed strategy pro¯les without regard to the strategic setting in question. As in Wolpert
3(2008), here we employ an entropic prior. Based on Shannon's entropy [see Shannon
(1948)], this prior favors mixed strategy pro¯les that contain less information over those
that contain more information. It also embodies the principal of insu±cient reason [see
Mackay (2003), Cover and Thomas (1991)].
The other modeling choice in the Bayesian PGT approach of this paper is to specify the
likelihood function. This is where information about the precise strategic environment
comes in to the modeling. In this paper we consider three likelihood functions. The
¯rst, introduced in Wolpert (2008), is based on a logit quantal response. The second is
based on an epsilon equilibrium-like concept. A third likelihood function uses a concept
new to the game theory community, that we call \intelligence" Wolpert (2003). All
three likelihoods assign relative probabilities to all mixed strategy pro¯les on the basis of
information about player utility functions and about player rationalities. So while PGT
is a new positive approach to game theory, PGT modeling relies heavily on concepts that
already exist in the game theory literature. (In future work, we intend to consider more
experimentally-grounded likelihoods, incorporating concepts like focal points, symmetry,
equality and player honesty.)
Given a prior and likelihood, in Bayesian PGT they are combined in the usual way.
This speci¯es the posterior distribution over mixed strategy pro¯les conditioned on the
information about the strategic environment. This posterior is the focus of the PGT
analysis, as it is the source of all predictive information.
With each of the likelihood models we discuss, there is no closed form for the posterior
distribution. However modelers can apply well-known Monte Carlo techniques such as
accept-reject and importance sampling to this posterior, to estimate its important char-
acteristics [see Robert and Casella (2004)]. For example, we demonstrate how to estimate
the marginalizations of the posterior distribution over mixed strategies | which is just
the posterior distribution over pure strategies. We also show how to estimate the associ-
ated covariance over pure strategies. Similarly, we show how to estimate the distributions
over expected utility pro¯les and over social welfare.
The information provided by these characteristics of the PGT posterior have no real
analog in conventional equilibrium concepts like the NE or QRE. The closest analog with
those concepts arises when there is a unique equilibrium. In such cases one can, for ex-
ample, take the \distribution over expected utility pro¯les" to be a Dirac delta function
about the expected utilities at the equilibrium. However when there are multiple equilib-
4ria, one cannot even do this; there is not a meaningful way to assign relative probabilities
to expected utilities at the multiple equilibria. Yet without these probabilities it is not
possible to perform prediction or mechanism design in a manner that is compatible with
decision theory.
For real-world applications of mechanism design, the probabilities returned by a PGT
model allow the researcher to answer the basic types of questions that stakeholders need
answered. For example:
² \Which mechanism is most e±cient?"
² \Which mechanism produces the least variance in e±ciency?"
² \What is the probability that mechanism A produces greater welfare than mecha-
nism B?"
² \Which mechanism has a greater probability of producing welfare below x?"
Without a proper statistical model, these questions simply cannot be answered.
Though the PGT posterior contains far more information than does a single point
prediction, it can easily provide such a point prediction if desired. One ad hoc way to
make such a prediction is to return the global maximizer of the posterior distribution,
called the Maximum A Posterior (MAP) prediction (assuming that maximizer is unique).
However, how to distill a distribution to a point prediction is a choice ultimately made
by the modeler external to the game; it is not part of the game speci¯cation itself. PGT
enables the modeler to conform with decision theory when making this choice. To do so,
the modeler ¯rst needs to clarify her objective in making the point prediction. In general,
this objective can be interpreted as minimizing some real-valued loss function whose
arguments are the prediction and the actual outcome. In particular, Savage's decision
theoretic axioms say that to make an optimal rational prediction, the modeler must choose
the prediction that minimizes expected posterior loss, where the expectation is taken
over the PGT posterior [see Savage (1954)]. For example, if the researcher uses an all-
or-nothing loss function, then the MAP is the prediction she should make. Alternatively,
for a quadratic loss function, the posterior mean is the appropriate prediction. Note that
regardless of the loss function, with PGT there is no equilibrium selection problem. In
general, the prediction that minimizes expected loss is unique.
There are many advantages of PGT that arise from its statistical nature. In particular,
with PGT we can incorporate other statistical information besides a conventional game
5speci¯cation in predicting player strategy pro¯les, by averaging over that information
to form the posterior over strategy pro¯les. For example, suppose the players know
another's utility functions | but the modeler does not know those utility functions.
However say that the modeler has data from an experiment that says half of the players
have preferences I 0 and the other half have preferences I 00. Then the modeler can
| indeed, should | account for her uncertainty by averaging over these preferences
in forming the posterior over mixed strategy pro¯les. In fact, any relevant information
of a statistical nature can be incorporated by averaging over it in the posterior. This
includes real-world and experimental data on preferences, focal points, rationality, etc. It
even includes information on the relative probabilities of various PGT likelihood models.
See Wolpert (2008) for more on the advantages of PGT over equilibrium concepts as a
way of modeling player behavior.
1.2 Roadmap of paper
We proceed as follows. First, we formally introduce the precise PGT approach investi-
gated in this paper. This includes a detailed description of three likelihood models and
an example that demonstrates how they compare. We brie°y discuss the basic properties
of these models. Then we introduce our prior distribution based on Shannon entropy.
Next we introduce a simple Cournot duopoly setting. This setting serves as a backdrop
for the exposition of key PGT concepts. In particular we generate various PGT distribu-
tions for the Cournot setting, including posteriors for pure strategies, pro¯ts and social
welfare. We show how modeler uncertainty regarding utility information is seamlessly
accounted for due to the statistical nature of PGT. We also show that point prediction in
the PGT framework is a well-de¯ned decision problem, because PGT formally quanti¯es
uncertainty over states of the world as a probability distribution. This contrasts with
the point prediction of conventional equilibrium-based approaches which do not provide
a distribution over all possible behaviors.
We introduce the bene¯ts of applying PGT to the problem of mechanism design. We
show how PGT allows the social planner to formulate the mechanism design problem
as an exercise in decision theory | which is not possible in conventional mechanism
design based on equilibrium concepts. In this way, for the ¯rst time, PGT allows the
social planner to be fully rational, in the decision theoretic sense. We demonstrate PGT
mechanism design in the context of a production tax on the duopoly market and show
6that the PGT results contrast with QRE and NE.
The ¯nal section suggests a long list of future work, including PGT for mechanism
design, dynamic games and repeated games as well as games of imperfect information,
coalitional games and unstructured bargaining.
The appendix details our computational approach to sampling the posterior. This
involves generating random mixtures of Gaussian distributions. We also outline our
Monte Carlo procedures for estimating moments of the posterior. Here we include a brief
discussion of computational issues, including a density of states phenomenon that arises
as the complexity of the game grows.
2 The PGT Model
We are interested in formulating a distribution over the space of mixed strategy pro¯les.
The set of pure actions for player i is Xi. The set of mixed strategies for player i is ¢(Xi).
A generic element of ¢(Xi) is qi, a mixed strategy. The set of mixed strategy pro¯les is
¢X = £i¢(Xi). A generic element of ¢X is q =
Q
i qi, a mixed strategy pro¯le.
The central focus of the PGT approach, from which all predictive information is
derived, is the posterior distribution, P(qjI), over mixed strategy pro¯les q 2 ¢X:
P(qjI) / P(q)L(Ijq); (1)
where P(q) is the prior distribution over mixed strategy pro¯les, I is information about
utility functions and L(Ijq) is the likelihood of I given q.
2.1 Likelihood
The likelihood function, written L(Ijq), gives greater weight to q's that better coincide
with the utility information as determined by some external criteria. In general, that
criteria is a modeling choice left to the modeler because it largely re°ects concerns speci¯c
to the strategic environment of interest. In this paper, we focus on likelihoods that involve
quanti¯cations of bounded rationality. Speci¯cally, we develop three models that give
greater weight to q's which re°ect greater rationality by the players. The ¯rst model,
QR-rationality, is based on the idea of a logit quantal response. The second model,
N-rationality, says that the likelihood of a player choosing a speci¯c qi when the other
7players choose q¡i depends on how close the corresponding payo® is to the best response
payo®. This model is closely related to the epsilon equilibrium concept, as it uses the
perfectly rational payo® as a target. The third model, intelligence, says that the likelihood
of a particular qi given q¡i depends on the proportion of strategies q0
i that yield a lower
expected payo® than qi, given q¡i. These three models are detailed below.
2.1.1 QR-rationality
In most games it is reasonable to think that players seek to maximize utility. However,
there are many reasons why an assumption of perfect rationality might not be suitable
for a given situation. Rather, we would like to incorporate some notion of bounded
rationality. Our ¯rst likelihood model, called QR-rationality (short for quantal response
rationality), incorporates bounded rationality by borrowing from the concept of a logit
quantal response. Under the logit quantal response, a player's rationality is given by
the degree to which that player responds optimally to the other players' strategies. This
degree of rationality is the criterion upon which our likelihood di®erentiates between q's.
Before we formally introduce our measure of QR-rationality, we ¯rst need more no-
tation. Let Ui
q¡i be the vector of expected utilities that player i gets from playing each
of his pure strategies against the mixture q¡i. We call this player i's environment. The





where Eq(uijxi;j) is player i's expected utility of playing his j'th pure strategy against the
mixture q¡i. The constant ¯i is a measure of i's rationality because as ¯i increases, the
mixed strategy L assigns greater probability to those pure strategies of i with greatest
expected utility. As shown in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), as ¯i ! 1, the logit mixed
strategy is a best response to q¡i.
So given any q (with ¯nite support), the question is how to calculate ¯i for each i. One
method of doing so is to ¯nd the ¯i that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance
from qi to the logit distribution parameterized by ¯i. The KL distance is a concept from
information theory that is used to measure the di®erence between two distributions [see


























By minimizing the KL distance from qi to the logit distrbution parameterized by ¯i,
we are ¯nding the logit distribution that most accurately models qi in an information
theoretic sense. Then we borrow the common interpretation of ¯i as i's rationality when
playing LUi
q¡i;¯i(xi) in response to q¡i. This gives us the following characterization of
rationality.
De¯nition 2.1. The QR-rationality of qi against q¡i is the value of ¯i that minimizes
the KL distance from qi to LUi
q¡i;¯i(xi), equation 2.
One potentially worrisome property of the QR-rationality parameter, that is also
shared by the logit-QRE, is that it is not invariant to positive rescalings of utility. In
other words, player QR-rationality parameters depend on units.
In the special case where q¡i is such that all entries of Ui
q¡i are identical, the QR-
rationality parameter ¯i can be any real number. This is the case in a mixed strategy
NE with full support, as the following example illustrates.
Example: Consider a mixed strategy NE in which each of two players randomize over 2
pure actions fx1;y1g for player one and fx2;y2g for player two with respective probabilities
(q;1 ¡ q) and (p;1 ¡ p). Theory states that move conditioned expected utilities must be
equal across any pure strategies that receive positive weight in an NE. Hence q might be
.0001, yet since the move conditioned expected utilities of x1 and y1 are the same, the
logit has no choice but to assign them both probability .5, and any ¯ will work for that.
So even though (p;q) is a NE, ¯ can be anything. This is because, according to QR-
rationality, a mixed strategy NE with full support is at once perfectly rational, irrational,
anti-rational and everything in-between §
For many settings, the set of q that feature the above problem is of zero measure
in ¢X. This means that when randomly sampling the posterior, as is outlined in the
appendix, the above anomaly will not be an issue. However, for completeness we de¯ne
¯i = 1 when q¡i is such that all entries of Ui
q¡i are identical. In other words, when i is
9indi®erent among his pure strategies, he is perfectly rational by default.
The next question is, given the choice QR-rationality to measure how smart players
are, what should the functional form of the likelihood L(Ijq) be? In other words, in
the absence of data about the particular human beings playing a game, how strongly
do we believe they are likely to be smart, as measured by QR-rationality? One simple






where each ®i measures how much more likely i is to be smart rather than dumb. Phys-
ically, L(Ijq) quanti¯es how likely it is that out of all games a set of real-world players
could have just played, that they played the game with utility information I, given that
they chose joint mixed strategy q when they played that game.
When looking at equation 3, it may be tempting to think of it as a type of averaging
of QRE's. This is not the case. Rather, not every q 2 ¢X is a QRE for properly chosen
¯. That's because equation 3 is de¯ned for every q, while only an in¯nitesimal subset of
product distributions are logit distributions.
It should be emphasized that 3 is not the only reasonable choice for a QR-rationality
likelihood.2 This is just like in statistics in general (and econometrics in particular).
When predicting player behavior in a game, ultimately the modeler must choose how to
quantify their insight into how the system's state is related to what information they
have concerning it, in terms of a likelihood.








This ratio is unchanged by removing mixed strategy pro¯les q00 6= q or q0 from the under-
lying space ¢X. That is because the quantity L(Ijq) from equation 3 does not depend








®i ln(¯i(q) + 1) + 1 if ¯i(q) ¸ 0
e®i¯i(q) otherwise.
10on the set of possible q's. In addition, because ¯ is not invariant to a±ne transformations
of utility, neither is the likelihood ratio.
Since we are using KL rationality, the choice of the form of the likelihood function
has implications for the convergence rate of Monte Carlo estimates of the posterior. This
is because the QR-rationality parameter, ¯i, can diverge to in¯nity for qi that are best
responses to q¡i. In¯nite values of ¯ are unlikely a problem in practice because best
response correspondences are often of measure zero in the space of ¢(Xi). However,
large ¯ are quite possible. Therefore, if L(Ijq) is unbounded as ¯(q) grows, Monte
Carlo estimates of the posterior may never converge.
Ultimately, the QR-rationality likelihood describes the underlying distribution of QR-
rationalities in the set of players. The true distribution cannot be known with certainty,
so any functional form will be wrong. The important point is that a non-degenerate
distribution over rationalities is, in many settings, an improvement over an assumption
of perfect rationality (as in NE) or a point mass assigned to a speci¯c imperfect rationality
(as in QRE). These settings include those for which learning has not yet converged to
equilibrium, multiple equilibria exist, or computational complexities are involved (which
covers most real-world settings).
2.1.2 N-rationality
Similar to QR-rationality, N-rationality says that the likelihood of qi given q¡i increases
as qi gets closer to a best response. The di®erence is how we measure the distance to
a best response. With N-rationality we borrow from the epsilon equilibrium concept to
say that players di®erentiate between responses according to the payo®s they generate.
Therefore, we measure the rationality of qi given q¡i as the normalized distance between
the payo® yielded by qi and the payo® yielded by i's worst response.
De¯nition 2.2. The N-rationality of qi against q¡i is the normalized distance from the








q¡i(xi)] is the minimum expected utility achievable by player i when the
other players are randomizing according to q¡i, and maxxi[Ui
q¡i(xi)] is similarly de¯ned.






Note that this formulation gives a likelihood ratio
L(q)
L(q0) that is invariant to a±ne
transformations of utility. It is also invariant to the deletion of strategies q0
i 2 ¢i(Xi)
except the minimizers and maximizers. It should again be noted that choosing a speci¯c
functional form for the N-rationality likelihood is subject to the same considerations as
were mentioned with respect to QR-rationality.
When using N-rationality the modeler must be careful that Ui
q¡i is bounded for every
q¡i. If one entry of Ui
q¡i diverges, then N-rationality is not well-de¯ned. Take for example
a ¯rst price auction with 2 players where x 2 R2
+ is the pro¯le of bids and v · 1 is
the pro¯le of valuations. If the modeler wants to use N-rationality here, then she cannot
specify that Ui(xi;x¡i) = vi¡xi whenever xi > xj for all x. This is because if i is allowed
to bid an in¯nite amount, then the minimum entry of Ui
qj is negative in¯nity for every
\reasonable" qj (i.e. qj in which there exists some number N such that qj(n) = 0 for all
n ¸ N) and unde¯ned for other qj.
2.1.3 Intelligence
As an alternative to the rationality criteria outlined above, an intelligence criterion is
useful in capturing the relative likelihood of coming across good responses in a random
search of one's strategy space.
De¯nition 2.3. The intelligence of qi against q¡i is the proportion of q0
i 2 ¢(Xi) such











where I(a ¸ a0) is the indicator function that returns one if the argument is true and






12The intelligence of q is de¯ned as the vectors of intelligences of each qi against q¡i
individually. We suggest one approach to estimating intelligence by importance sampling
¢(Xi) that is general enough to be applied to any game. However, more e±cient methods
for calculating intelligence in closed form may be available depending on the details of
the game in question (see matching pennies example below).
Since it occurs in the associated likelihood function, we will want to estimate the
integral 6 to investigate that likelihood. One way to do that is with Monte Carlo esti-
mation. To do this we will choose a sampling density h(¢) with full support on ¢(Xi).
In our case, a su±cient condition for obtaining a ¯nite variance estimator [see Geweke
(1989)] is that 1
h(qi) is bounded for all qi 2 ¢(Xi). (Formally, this is true because ¢(Xi)
is compact, varf(I(¢)) is bounded, and because our target density f(qi) is uniform, it is
therefore bounded over ¢(Xi). )
Having selected a suitable distribution h(¢), we can form T i:i:d: samples fq0
i;tgT
t=1.
The estimate of intelligence is then:









Repeating the above procedure for each player i yields a vector of player intelligences,
»(q), where »i(q) is the estimated intelligence of qi. As usual, we want the likelihood
function to assign more weight to q than q0 if and only if q is more intelligent than q0.








L(q0) for the likelihood in equation 7 are invariant under a±ne
transformations of utility. However, it is clear from the de¯nition of intelligence that the
likelihood ratio between q and q0 does not remain unchanged when deleting q00 from ¢X.
Just as the choices of likelihood function for QR-rationality and N-rationality depend
on the speci¯cs of the strategic setting, so does the choice of likelihood function for intel-
ligence. Ultimately, the likelihood implies a distribution over intelligence or rationality.




I(»(q) = ^ »)L(Ijq)dq (8)
13where I(a = a0) is the indicator function that returns one when the argument is true and
zero otherwise. Therefore, changes in the likelihood imply changes in the distribution of
intelligence or rationality.
2.1.4 Example: comparing likelihood criteria
The following example illustrates the di®erence between QR-rationality, N-rationality,
and intelligence.
Consider zero-sum matching pennies, where player 1 wants to match and player 2
wants to mismatch. Assume the environment where player 1 randomizes with q1 = :25.
Then for any given q2, the proportion of alternatives q0
2 2 [0;1] that give expected utility
less than or equal to q2 is simply q2. In other words, when q1 = :25, the intelligence of q2
is »2(q) = q2. If q1 increases to q0
1 = :4, the intelligence of q2 is still »i(q) = q2.
Now consider QR-rationality in both cases, q1 = :25 and q0
1 = :4. In the ¯rst case,
where q1 = :25, ¯2(q) solves
q2 =
exp[¯2(¡:25 + :75)]
exp[¯2(¡:25 + :75)] + exp[¯2(:25 ¡ :75)]
and in the second case, where q0
1 = :4, ¯2(q) solves
q2 =
exp[¯2(¡:4 + :6)]
exp[¯2(¡:4 + :6)] + exp[¯2(:4 ¡ :6)]





In the second case, where q0
1 = :4, we have
´2(:4;q2) = :2q2:
In both cases, q1 = :25 and q0
1 = :4, intelligence equals »2(q) = q2. However, QR-
rationality, ¯2(q), changes when q1 changes from :25 to :4. Whether ¯2(q) increases or
decreases depends on the value of q2. N-rationality also changes when q1 changes from
:25 to :4, but the direction of the change is certain. It decreases.
142.2 Prior
The role of the prior distribution, P(q) is to quantify the modeler's subjective beliefs
about the relative probabilities of mixed strategy pro¯les without regard to the utility
information used by the likelihood function, L(Ijq). At ¯rst glance, the task of formu-
lating any beliefs about a distribution of mixed strategy pro¯les without the bene¯t of
utility information may seem di±cult and/or unproductive.
However based on any of several separate sets of simple desiderata, there is a unique
real-valued quanti¯cation of the amount of syntactic information in a distribution q(x)
[see Shannon (1948), Mackay (2003), Cover and Thomas (1991)]. That quanti¯cation, the
Shannon entropy of a density q, is written as S(q) = ¡
P
x q(x)ln(q(x)). The entropic
prior density is written as P(q) / exp(±S(q)) for real-valued parameter ±.
For ± > 0, the entropic prior assigns greater probability to mixed strategy pro¯les that
are more di®use. This is attractive from a modeling perspective because it represents an
agnostic way of di®erentiating between q's that have the same likelihood. More precisely,
say we have two mixed strategy pro¯les, q and q0, that have the same QR-rationality, and
therefore the same likelihood. With ± > 0, the posterior then favors the mixed strategy





Alternatively, setting ± < 0 has an important behavioral interpretation. If, for ex-
ample, the researcher believes that human beings are particularly poor at randomizing,
then such a speci¯cation will re°ect this by giving greater weight to q's that are \less
random." We can call this the anti-entropic prior.
Naturally, the entropic prior and anti-entropic prior can be combined. To be clear,
suppose ±e > 0 is the parameter for the entropic prior, and ±a < 0 is the parameter for the
anti-entropic prior. Then the combined prior is P(q) / k exp(±eS(q))+(1¡k)exp(±aS(q)).
In this way the researcher expresses that her prior beliefs involve ambiguity in addition to
uncertainty. This ambiguity says that the researcher is uncertain about her prior beliefs.
She believes with probability k that her beliefs should be modeled by the maximum
entropy principal, and with probability (1 ¡ k) that they should be modeled by human
beings' general lack of skill in randomizing.
The entropic prior is not the only candidate for prior distribution. Indeed, it just
15one member of the Cressie-Read family of distributions [see Cressie and Read (1984);
Read and Cressie (1988)]. However, we adhere to the entropic prior (± > 0) as it is
consistent with the principle of maximum entropy [see Jaynes (1957)], which can itself
be derived from the principal of insu±cient reason [see Jaynes (2003)]. The principle of
insu±cient reason tends that when faced with a set of possibilities that are indistinguish-
able based on the data at hand, each possibility should be equally likely [see Poincare
(1912)]. The entropic prior upholds that principle because it says that for a given ^ ¯ the
mixed strategy pro¯le q that comes closest to putting equal weight on each pure strategy
(i.e. maximizes entropy), subject to ¯(q) = ^ ¯, is the most likely.
3 Cournot Duopoly
Here we introduce a familiar strategic setting, the Cournot duopoly, for the purpose
of demonstrating the models and techniques of the previous section. We also use the
Cournot setting to compare our models with NE and QRE predictions. Finally, we will
discuss mechanism comparison under the PGT approach by introducing an externality
to the duopoly market and comparing outcomes under various tax rates.
The Cournot duopoly we use is standard. There are two ¯rms, A and B, that produce
goods A and B respectively. They each decide simultaneously how much of their own
good to produce. The produced quantities are xA 2 XA = [0; ¹ xA] and xB 2 XB = [0; ¹ xB],
where ¹ xi is the maximum quantity that ¯rm i can produce and X = XA£XB. The price
that each ¯rm receives for its own good is determined by market demand. Market demand
for ¯rm i's product is decreasing in both xi and xj, where i 6= j. That is, the price that
¯rm i can charge for good i decreases as the quantity of good i and the quantity of good





@xj · 0 for all (xi;xj) 2 X. The total cost for either ¯rm i of producing xi units of
good i are given by Ci(xi) with the assumptions Ci(xi) ¸ 0,
@Ci
@xi ¸ 0 and
@2Ci
@x2
i ¸ 0 for all
xi 2 Xi. Therefore, ¯rm i's pro¯t function is written as ¦i(xi;xj) = xiDi(xi;xj)¡Ci(xi).
For illustrative purposes, we study this model for speci¯c parametric forms of Di(¢;¢)





di1 ¡ di2xi + di3x2
i ¡ di4x3
i ¡ xj; if greater than zero
0; otherwise
16where ¡di2 +2di3xi ¡3di4x2
i · 0 for all xi 2 Xi ensures that
@Di






These parametric forms allow us to describe a very broad range of strategic settings
while remaining clear and concise in our descriptions. For example, the parameters
[¹ xi = 20;di1 = 20:4;di2 = 2:165;di3 = 0:12;di4 = 0:0025;ci1 = 16;000;000] for i = A;B
produce the symmetric best response functions, x¤
i(xj), in ¯gure 1 below. In this example
















Figure 1: Best response functions for ¹ xi = 20;di1 = 20:4;di2 = 2:165;di3 = 0:12;di4 =
0:0025;ci1 = 16;000;000 for i = A;B.
there are ¯ve intersections of the best response functions, indicating ¯ve pure strategy
NE.
Changing the parameter dA1 from 20:4 to 19:1 drastically changes the set of equilibria
without drastically changing ¯rm A's pro¯t function. This situation is depicted in ¯gure
2.
Finally, a completely new set of parameters [¹ xi = 9;di1 = 7:1;di2 = 0:8;di3 =
0:15;di4 = 0:0125;ci1 = 401:7] for i = A;B drastically changes the set of NE and their
relative locations. This is depicted in ¯gure 3 below.














Figure 2: Best response functions for the same parameters as in ¯gure 1, except that
dA1 = 19:1 instead of 20:4.
We use these three strategic settings (i.e., three parameter vectors) as illustrative tools
in discussing the results below. We refer to each by its corresponding ¯gure number 1, 2
and 3 respectively.
4 Results
In order to make predictions about the outcome of our Cournot duopoly, we need to know
P(xjI) from equation 9, the posterior probabilities of each of the pure strategy pro¯les.






This includes expected pro¯ts, expected welfare, expected covariance, etc.
Unfortunately, we cannot evaluate the posterior in closed form for any of the likeli-
hoods discussed in this paper. Therefore, we must numerically estimate it. We use the
Monte Carlo method of importance sampling to do so. Importance sampling relies on














Figure 3: Best response functions for ¹ xi = 9;di1 = 7:1;di2 = 0:8;di3 = 0:15;di4 =
0:0125;ci1 = 401:7 for i = A;B.
taking draws from a known distribution H(q) in order to estimate an unknown distribu-
tion P(qjI). This means we need a population of mixed strategy pro¯les, q's, from the
space of mixed strategy pro¯les, ¢X.
In the Cournot duopoly application, quantities, xi, can take on any value in the
interval [0; ¹ xi] for i = A;B. So a single qi is a vector of in¯nite length. For obvious
computational reasons, we cannot work directly with such vectors. Therefore, we need
to discretize the space of mixed strategy pro¯les. That is, the actual value of E[f(q)] is
an integral over an in¯nite-dimensional space, ¢X, but we want to estimate this integral
over a ¯nite-dimensional space. However, we must be careful to do so in a way such that
our estimate of the posterior approximates the actual posterior.
Our solution is to form a population of q's by randomly drawing mixtures of Gaussian
distributions. The details of our sampling procedure are given in the appendix. The
appendix also describes how we estimate the integral in equation 10.
As described above, P(xjI) gives the posterior density over the space of pure strategy
pro¯les, X. For the Cournot setting in ¯gure 1, P(xjI) is given below in ¯gure 4 for


























Figure 4: The PGT posterior over x's from the QR-rationality model with parameter
® = 4. Cournot parameters are ¹ xi = 20;di1 = 20:4;di2 = 2:165;di3 = 0:12;di4 =
0:0025;ci1 = 16;000;000 for i = A;B.
The issue of which likelihood to use, QR-rationality, N-rationality or intelligence, is
similar to the issue of which equilibrium re¯nement to use. The answer depends on
the setting in question. Ultimately, experiments and real-world data must decide which
likelihood is best for the given setting. However, here we are merely illustrating results
for some choices of likelihood, in a way that is similar to illustrating results for some
choices of equilibrium re¯nement.
It is important to note that, with PGT, modelers are not constrained to make a
hard choice among the likelihoods presented here. Because the PGT approach is fully
4Since the Cournot game move space is uncountable, the space of q's is in¯nite-dimensional. This
means that our intelligence measure as discussed above is not well-de¯ned. For that reason, we do not
























Figure 5: The PGT posterior over x's from the N-rationality model with parameter
® = 15. Cournot parameters are ¹ xi = 20;di1 = 20:4;di2 = 2:165;di3 = 0:12;di4 =
0:0025;ci1 = 16;000;000 for i = A;B.
statistical, it is trivial to combine likelihood models to re°ect the modeler's uncertainty
about which model is best in a given situation. When such uncertainty exists, the modeler
can assign convex weights to each likelihood. The weights represent her beliefs about the
relative explanatory power of each model. Then the full model is a weighted combination
of the component models.
In the same way that we can express model uncertainty by combining di®erent like-
lihoods, we can express uncertainty over ¯rm pro¯t functions by averaging over pro¯t
functions. To illustrate this, let k be the probability that the pro¯t function parame-
ters are those depicted in ¯gure 1 (I 0), and let 1 ¡ k be the probability that the pro¯t
function parameters are those depicted in ¯gure 2 (I 00). Recall that I 0 has ¯ve NE,
and I 00 has only one. Loosely speaking, by using PGT we can average those two sets of


























Figure 6: QR-rationality PGT distribution over moves when modeling modeler uncer-
tainty about ¯rm A's pro¯t function (® = 2:75).
and break the likelihood into two parts:
L(Ijq) = kL(I
0jq) + (1 ¡ k)L(I
00jq):
Figure 6 depicts a combination of I 0 and I 00 with k = :5 under the QR-rationality
likelihood.
This averaging out modeler uncertainty over utility functions can be applied to any
information concerning utility function values, I. Note that we are concerned here with
the modeler's uncertainty of the utility functions. (Since the players have complete infor-
mation in the Cournot game scenarios we are analyzing, they have no such uncertainty.)
It is not clear how one might address such uncertainty using conventional equilibrium
concepts. There does not seem to be a statistically meaningful way to combine the ¯ve
22NE of I 0 with the one NE of I 00.
4.1 Correlation of pure strategies
Despite the fact that each q 2 ¢X is a product distribution, P(xjI) is generally not
a product distribution. Therefore, there is coupling between xA and xB under P(xjI).
This coupling of pure strategies is di®erent than the correlation that arises in a correlated
equilibrium [see Aumann (1974)], as the result of learning, or as the result of pre-play
communication. The coupling between xA and xB that arises in P(xjI) is the result of
averaging over P(qjI). That is, there is coupling between the players' pure strategies
from the researcher's perspective because she is averaging over all q's. However, there is no
coupling between the player's pure strategies from the players' perspective because they
choose their strategies independently, i.e. each q is in the space of product distributions.
As an example, consider an industry comprising many ¯rms, where the ¯rms repeat-
edly play two-player games with one another. Say that a regulator of that industry
observes the joint moves of many di®erent pairs of ¯rms engaged in such two-player
games. Then even if there is no collusion { in each game, the moves of the two ¯rms
are independent { to the regulator it would appear as though there is collusion in the
industry.
Consider the duopoly setting from ¯gure 1 with the QR-rationality likelihood where
® = 4. Our estimate of the correlation between xA and xB is small in magnitude, just
¡0:002, yet it is statistically signi¯cant at the 95% level. Changes to the likelihood, such
as an increase in ®, can increase the magnitude of this correlation. For instance, by
setting ® = 100, we increase the correlation to 0:095. Naturally, the utility information
also a®ects the degree of coupling in P(xjI). For the duopoly setting from ¯gure 2 with
® = 100, the correlation is ¡0:062.
Alternatively, a QRE is, by de¯nition, a product distribution. Hence it does not
exhibit coupling between xA and xB. For comparison with the PGT distributions, we
present in ¯gure 7 the QRE distribution for the duopoly setting from ¯gure 1. Recall
from equation 8 that the likelihood function implies a distribution over rationality or
intelligence. For the PGT distribution from ¯gure 4, we ¯nd that the mean of the
implied distribution over QR-rationality is approximately 0:2.5 Therefore, we use ¯ = 0:2
5For more on the distribution over QR-rationality and how it relates to a density of states phenomenon,


























Figure 7: QRE distribution of moves with ¯ = 0:2.
to generate the comparison QRE distribution in ¯gure 7.
4.2 Predicting outcomes
A point prediction is merely a choice under uncertainty made by a modeler. There is
a decision theory for making rational choices under uncertainty that is well-founded on
basic axioms of rationality [see von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947); Savage (1954);
Luce (1959)]. Game theoretic predictions should also adhere to decision theory if they
are to be rational. By providing a probability distribution over behavior, PGT enables
the modeler to use decision theory to make rational predictions.
To start, we need those elements of a decision under uncertainty that are prescribed
by decision theory:
1. a set of alternatives - the set of mixed strategy pro¯les
2. a probability distribution over states of the world - the PGT posterior
243. an objective - a quanti¯cation of the modeler's preferences (i.e. a loss function)
While the objective and the set of alternatives are often determined by the statement of
the research problem, the probability distribution over states of the world is precisely the
reason we consult a model. If the model does not produce such a probability distribution,
then we cannot properly use it for prediction.
Since the PGT approach yields a distribution over alternatives, q's, we can use it to
make a rational prediction. Suppose a modeler wants to predict the quantities (xA;xB)
that will be played in the Cournot duopoly. Suppose further that this modeler has a loss
function. This loss function is not de¯ned as a part of the game in question. Rather it
is speci¯ed by the modeler to quantify the penalty she su®ers for predicting x0 when the
realized pro¯le is x. There are many ways to quantify this penalty. All-or-nothing loss
functions report a zero when x0 = x and one otherwise. They are primarily appropriate
when the modeler cares only about predicting the exact outcome, and proximity does
not matter. In the Cournot duopoly example, quantities can take on any values between
zero and ¹ xi. Therefore, the probability of predicting the exact outcome is very low,
suggesting that an all-or-nothing loss function may not be appropriate for the Cournot
setting. However, if the modeler does apply an all-or-nothing loss function to the Cournot
setting, she should choose the most likely quantity pro¯le. With the PGT posterior, the







We can easily apply this loss function to the Cournot duopoly setting depicted in ¯gure
1 or its slight variation in ¯gure 2. Under the QR-rationality likelihood, the MAP from
the ¯rst setting is approximately (4:5;4:5), while the MAP prediction from the second
setting is approximately (10;2).
Other loss functions, such as the quadratic loss function, penalize based on the dis-
tance between x0 and x. Therefore quadratic loss function may be appropriate when a
modeler prefers a close prediction to a far-o® prediction even when the close prediction
is still not quite equal to the realized value. Suppose our loss function is quadratic,
L(x;x0) = jjx0 ¡ xjj2, where x0 is the predicted pro¯le and x is the realized pro¯le. Then









Using QR-rationality, and applying the quadratic loss function to the Cournot duopoly
example depicted in ¯gure 1, we predict x¤ ¼ (8:97;8:97). For the slight variation in
¯gure 2 we predict x¤ ¼ (9:4;8:6).
We can contrast the above predictions with the NE and QRE counterparts. The
Cournot duopoly setting from in ¯gure 1 yields a QRE expected quantity pro¯le of
approximately (7:4;7:4) (for ¯ = 0:2), and a set of pure NE pro¯les
f(16:6;0:95);(10:2;3:1);(5:6;5:6);(0:95;16:6);(3:1;10:2)g:
The QRE prediction is less than the PGT prediction. It is not possible to compare the
PGT and NE predictions because there are multiple NE. However, we do note that the
total output predicted by the PGT model is greater than the total output under any pure
NE.
The example depicted in ¯gure 2 yields a QRE expected quantity pro¯le of ap-
proximately (6:3;8:2) and a unique pure NE pro¯le of (0:55;16:8). The fact that both
equilibrium-based predictions have ¯rm B producing more than ¯rm A is in stark con-
trast to the PGT predictions, where ¯rm A produces more than ¯rm B. The divergence
between PGT predictions and their equilibrium-based counterparts arises because the
prior and likelihood assign nonzero weight to more than one q. This is precisely the
reason that PGT prediction a well-de¯ned decision problem.
Finally, we note that sometimes the researcher may be interested in predicting mixed
strategy pro¯les rather than pure strategy pro¯les. This may be the case when the re-
searcher is attempting to choose among several mechanisms to implement and cares about
the distribution of pure strategies the players will employ rather than the outcome of any
one instance of the game. The mechanics of prediction are the same in both situations.
The only di®erence is that we use P(qjI) instead of P(xjI), and the researcher's loss
function must be de¯ned for q's rather than for x's. Otherwise, the researcher minimizes
expected posterior loss in precisely the same way.
264.3 Mechanism Design
Given the above, there is no reason that we need to abandon decision theory when
deciding among mechanisms to implement. This is one area in which the PGT approach
opens a whole new level of analysis.
Consider, for example, the decision that a social planner faces when choosing a tax
level for regulating a duopoly market with negative externalities. For simplicity, assume
that there are two possible taxes that the social planner has to consider, ¿H and ¿L. Let
wk(q) stand for social welfare (the social planner's objective function) at tax level k. If
there are unique NE qH¤ and qL¤ under the respective taxes, and the players are known to
be fully rational, then using conventional game theory, the social planner decides between
¿H and ¿L by comparing wH(qH¤) and wL(qL¤).
If there are multiple equilibria, or if the social planner has any uncertainty about the
players' rationality (or payo®s), then the social planner simply cannot use such equilib-
rium approaches to make a rational decision. This is because equilibrium concepts do
not provide a probability distribution over the multiple equilibria, so the social planner
cannot compute expected welfare as decision theory prescribes.
To choose a mechanism using a PGT model, simply select the mechanism, m, that
maximizes expected social welfare over the corresponding posterior. In the context of
our duopoly market, consider the scenario represented by the best response functions in
¯gure 3. We model a simple negative externality in this market by assuming external
costs equal to EC(x) = e1x.6 We also assume that the social welfare function equals ¯rm
pro¯ts plus tax revenue minus external costs. For a given behavior, q, and tax level k
this is:
wm(q) = Eq[¼A + ¼B] + Eq[xA + xB](¿m ¡ e1):
Averaging the social welfare function for each tax level over the posterior, we deter-





Suppose ¿H = 4 and ¿L = 2. Then for our example, E[wL(q)] ¼ 6:1 and E[wH(q)] ¼ 5:2.
Without taxes, expected social welfare is E[w0(q)] ¼ ¡0:3. Hence, the social planner
can choose the tax rate that yields greatest expected social welfare, ¿L. Note that,
6For more on equilibrium analysis of Cournot e±ciency see Seade (1985)
27because we are taking an expectation of social welfare over all behavior according to the
distribution Pm(qjI), the optimal mechanism may be very di®erent from the mechanism
that corresponds to the equilibrium with the highest social welfare. In other words, we
may have
EL[wL(q)] > EH[wH(q)];
even though there are equilibria qH¤ and qL¤ such that wH(qH¤) > wL(qL¤). The implica-
tion is that a conventional approach to mechanism design ignores potentially consequen-
tial uncertainty about which strategies will be used.
There is also a subtle implication for risk aversion here. Suppose
g(wm(q)) = (wm(q))
r = (Eq[¼A + ¼B] + Eq[xA + xB](¿m ¡ e1))
r
where r 2 [0;1]. This says that if the social planner knows the behavior qm that each
mechanism m will elicit, then she will simply choose the mechanism that maximizes
wm(qm). However, if she is uncertain about which behavior qm will be elicited by mech-
anism m, then she can be risk averse. In other words, even if the social planner is not
averse to the risk that a given behavior will produce bad outcomes, she may still be
averse to the risk that the mechanism will systematically elicit bad behavior. Modeling
the social planner's objective this way is particularly appealing in the case of a major
market change like new taxes. Major market changes are the result of costly legislative
processes, and are often very di±cult to retract once in place. Therefore, a social planner
may be averse to the risk that ¯rms engage systematically in behavior that is detrimental
to her objective. She may prefer a mechanism that produces a lower expectation of w(q)
with a tighter distribution rather than a mechanism that produces a higher expectation
of w(q) with a broader distribution.
Using PGT and standard decision theory, the social planner fully accounts for un-
certainty when choosing mechanisms. She has a complete decision framework. If she
¯nds that a particular PGT model does not incorporate relevant behavioral considera-
tions, such as truth-telling, market exit/entry decisions, etc., then she simply quanti¯es
these considerations and expands the PGT model to include them. In this way, the PGT
approach, like all statistical modeling, is completely modular.
Because a PGT model produces a distribution over behavior pro¯les for each tax
scheme, it also produces a distribution over the value of the social planner's objective for
28each tax scheme. These distributions allow us to fully compare mechanisms by answering
basic questions that real-world stakeholders ask. For instance,
² \Which of the taxes has greatest expected social welfare?"
² \Which of the taxes produces greater variance in welfare?"
² \What is the probability that ¿H produces greater welfare than ¿L?"
² \Which of the taxes has a greater probability of producing welfare below some
threshold value?"
Such questions simply cannot be answered using conventional approaches. Therefore,
when advising a regulator on which tax to implement, we must use PGT.
Using the duopoly setting from ¯gure 3 we get the posterior distributions over social
welfare, w(p), from ¿0 (i.e. no tax), ¿L and ¿H. These are displayed in ¯gure 8. There are
several features of these distributions to note. First, the high tax level ¿H = 4 produces
a strongly bi-modal distribution that leads to the highest variance in social welfare. The
high tax level gives both the highest probability of low social welfare (below ¡5) and the
highest probability of high social welfare (above 20). These features of the ¿H distribution
of social welfare mean that a risk averse social planner is unlikely to select the high tax
level.
The low tax level, ¿L = 2, distribution over social welfare very nearly ¯rst-order
stochastic dominates the zero tax distribution. Hence, it is unlikely that any social
planner, no matter how risk averse, will ever choose zero tax. The low tax level also
clearly gives the lowest probability of social welfare less than zero. This obviously means
it gives the highest probability of social welfare greater than zero (i.e. loss avoidance). It
also gives the highest probability of social welfare greater than 10.
Figure 8 also shows that NE and QRE expected social welfare is greatest for the
high tax level, ¿H. However, as mentioned above, PGT expected social welfare is greatest
under the low tax level, ¿L. Like the di®erences between PGT predictions and equilibrium-
based predictions, this di®erence stems from the fact that PGT gives non-zero weight to
multiple q's. Therefore, PGT expected social welfare is averaged over these multiple
mixed strategy pro¯les, while with equilibrium-based approaches, expected social welfare
comes from a single mixed strategy pro¯le.
Finally note that because the mechanism design problem is couched fully within deci-
sion theory, it is straightforward to introduce constraints. For example, the social planner













PGT tax = 2
PGT tax = 4
QRE no tax
NE no tax
QRE tax = 2
QRE tax = 4
NE tax=2
NE tax = 4
Figure 8: PGT (QR-rationality, ® = :75), QRE (¯ = :5) and NE distributions over
expected welfare for tax rates 0, 2 and 4.
may not want to choose a mechanism for which the probability that ¯rms make negative
pro¯ts is greater than lower bound. To work with such a constraint, we must know the
distribution of expected pro¯ts. With PGT, the information is readily available, and we
display it in ¯gure 9 for the duopoly setting from ¯gure 1 with ® = 4.
Using the distribution of expected pro¯ts, it is straightforward to calculate the prob-
ability that the ¯rms will both achieve some minimum pro¯t, the probability that they
will together achieve some minimum aggregate pro¯t, or any other quantity of interest.
Making these calculations for each mechanism further informs the social planner for the






























Figure 9: PGT distribution of pro¯ts versus NE pro¯ts, QRE pro¯ts, and PGT expected
pro¯ts.
5 Future Work
PGT is an important step forward for game theory. By de¯nition, PGT puts a probabil-
ity distribution on all states of the world. Therefore, when the goal is prediction and/or
mechanism design, PGT is the only approach that is compatible with decision theory.
It allows for any degree of uncertainty with respect to payo® functions and model spec-
i¯cation. It also seamlessly incorporates the important and growing body of data from
the behavioral economics literature. In many cases, PGT models can be formulated to
recover a statistical analog of conventional equilibrium concepts (i.e. likelihood assigns
zero weight to non-NE q's).
There is a long list of additional issues yet to be fully addressed. In this paper we
focused on the simplest formulation of PGT, a one-shot simultaneous-move game. How-
31ever, the PGT approach translates directly to repeated and dynamic games. Future work
should develop models for such situations, potentially allowing for learning. To be suc-
cessful, such work must also focus on computational issues. Of primary importance is
a \density of states phenomenon" that arises in the space of product distributions. In
particular, as ¢X becomes larger, highly intelligent and/or rational q's are drawn less
frequently from the proposal distribution, H(½;¹;§), that we describe in the appendix.
Dynamic games naturally increase the dimensionality of the players' strategy spaces and
therefore the dimensionality of ¢X. As the dimensionality increases linearly, the conver-
gence rates of our Monte Carlo estimations slow exponentially.
Although we described the way in which modelers can incorporate their own uncer-
tainty regarding player payo®s into PGT, we avoided modeling each player's uncertainty
about her opponents' payo® functions. This will be an important issue going forward,
as most real-world settings involve such uncertainty. To predict behavior and choose
mechanisms in such settings, we must have a PGT model that treats this uncertainty
directly.
The PGT approach should also be adapted to coalitional and unstructured bargaining
situations.7 Like noncooperative games, conventional coalitional and unstructured bar-
gaining models have focused on analytic or set-valued solutions rather than prediction.
Therefore, they share the same shortcomings in terms of prediction and mechanism de-
sign. We anticipate that advances in this direction will borrow from existing ideas, such
as the core and Shapley Value [see Aumann (1961); Shapley (1953)], in much the same
way the analysis of this paper borrowed from QRE and epsilon-equilibrium.
Finally, the mechanism design problem discussed above was relatively simple because
there were only three possible taxation levels.8 In general, the problem will be to describe
some set of variables that fall under the control of the social planner and a®ect the
strategic environment. Then mechanism design is simply searching for the values of
those variables that maximize the expectation of the social planner's objective over the
PGT distribution induced by those variables. For example, if the social planner can







7Predictive Coalitional Theory (PCT) and Predictive Unstructured Bargaining (PUB) respectively.
8Predictive Mechanism Design (PMD)
32With most PGT models, we will not be able to solve for the gradient of expected social
welfare. Therefore, successful work in this area will likely borrow Monte Carlo optimiza-
tion techniques from statistics and control theory.
Although PGT is a way forward for game theory, it will always rely heavily on existing
concepts (i.e. NE, QRE, level-k, behavioral economics, etc.) and problem domains
(dynamic games, learning, incomplete information, etc.). These have proven to provide
valuable insight into strategic human interaction, and are indispensable for the pursuit
of better statistical models.
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35A Sampling the Posterior
Our solution for sampling from P(qjI) is to form a population of q's by randomly draw-
ing mixtures of Gaussian distributions. The q's are drawn from the sampling distribution
H(q) = H(½;¹;§). Without much information about the space of joint distributions q,
it is safest to explore the space of triples (½;¹;§) uniformly. Hence, each ½i is sampled
uniformly from the Mi-dimensional simplex, where Mi is the number of mixture com-
ponents in qi. The means, ¹i, are sampled uniformly from the hypercube given by lower
and upper bounds ¹il and ¹ih. Finally, §
j
i is the covariance matrix of the j'th component
of i's mixture distribution. It is determined by random Jacobi rotations of a diagonal
matrix with eigenvalues ¸. These eigenvalues are drawn from a uniform distribution with
lower bound ¸l and upper bound ¸h. In order to guarantee positive de¯niteness of §i
j, ¸l
is non-negative.
Speci¯cally, to obtain each q, we draw a mixture of truncated multivariate normal













































The constant Zi normalizes the mixture to the hypercube [Li;Bi], where Li is the mini-
mum of i's action and Bi is its maximum. Di is the dimensionality of i's mixed strategy
vector.
The question of whether to let M (the vector that gives the number of component
distributions in each player's mixture) be ¯xed or allow it to be determined randomly
remains. Aside from the obvious computational issues that arise by extending the dimen-
sion of our integral over all possible values of M, there are strong behavioral reasons to
¯x the number of component distributions. Suppose Mi = ¹ M. With ¹ M components,
a mixture of Gaussians can have any number of peaks less than or equal to ¹ M. In a
36behavioral model, it does not seem unreasonable to assign probability zero to situations
in which a player has a mixed strategy with many multiple peaks. This restriction con-
tradicts the QRE, which assumes that each qi can have any number of peaks. However
as shown in the results section, restricting the sampling routine to single-peaked q's does
not rule out the possibility of a multi-modal posterior distribution over xi's.
The Cournot duopoly in this paper involves only two players each with a one-dimensional
move space. Therefore, importance sampling with a uniform proposal distribution is feasi-
ble. However, as more players are introduced, and the move spaces increase in dimension,
the space of q's grows exponentially. With higher dimensional games, a uniform proposal
distribution may not e±ciently explore the space of q's. In such a case, it may be more
appropriate to select a more targeted proposal distribution or to employ alternative sam-
pling routines such as the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
B Estimating Statistics
Now that we have a method for sampling the posterior, it is possible to form Monte Carlo
estimates of statistics that come from the posterior.
Let q½;¹;¾ be the parameterized mixed strategy pro¯le distribution and f(q½;¹;¾) be


























is the normalizing constant.
As an example, choose f(q) = q. Then E½;¹;¾(f(q) j I) = E½;¹;¾(q j I) is the
expected mixed strategy pro¯le. Now each mixed strategy pro¯le q is a distribution
P(x j q). Accordingly, for this choice of f, E½;¹;¾(f(q) j I) is just the posterior expected
pure strategy pro¯le, P(x j I).
37We can estimate the numerator integral in equation 11 with T i.i.d. samples f½(t);¹(t);§(t)gT
t=0

























Here we brie°y describe two computational issues that arise in PGT modeling. The ¯rst
concerns a \density of states phenomenon" that arises as the complexity of the game
grows. The second concerns the choice of QR-rationality likelihood so that Monte Carlo
estimates converge.
C.1 Density of states
In many cases it will be very di±cult to have any idea what the space of mixed strategy
pro¯les, ¢X, looks like. In particular, it will be di±cult to know how to e±ciently
sample this space so that we draw with high probability the types of q's that get high
probability under P(qjI). Therefore, we resort to a proposal distribution H(½;¹;§) that
is roughly uniform over the set of mixtures of Gaussians. This can be very ine±cient. In
addition, as the complexity of the game in question grows, the ine±ciency of a uniform
proposal distribution grows. In the Cournot setting from ¯gure 1, we drew 120,000 q's
from H(½;¹;§). The histogram of these rationalities for ¯rm A is given below:
Note that the mass is tightly packed around zero, which represents complete non-
rationality. The density drops o® quickly when moving away from zero in either direc-
tion. Because our draws of qA and qB are independent under H(¢) for each q, the joint
distribution of (¯A;¯B) is the product distribution. This means that while we have a very
low probability of drawing a high rationality q for one ¯rm, the probability of drawing a
high rationality q for both ¯rms is far lower still.
As the number of players increases, the density of states problem gets worse. It

















Figure 10: Histogram of ¯rm A's QR-rationality parameters, ¯A, from 120k random draws
of q for Cournot setting from ¯gure 1.
also gets worse as the dimensionality of each individual's strategy space increases. For
example, if each ¯rm were to choose a quantity and a price, then the associated histogram
for QR-rationality would be much tighter around zero than even the histogram in ¯gure
10.
For the intelligence criterion, the density of states means that most q's yield an in-




The QR-rationality criterion is unbounded. The parameter ¯ can vary from ¡1 to 1.
Therefore, if our Monte Carlo estimates of the posterior and its moments are to converge,
then we must worry about the speci¯c form of the likelihood function.
In particular, as we established in the discussion of density of states above, the prob-
39ability of drawing a q with high QR-rationality under the proposal distribution H(¢) can
be vanishingly small. So if the likelihood is not bounded above for large ¯, then the ratio
L(Ijq½(t);¹(t);¾(t))
H(q½(t);¹(t);¾(t))
will diverge for q that give rise to large ¯. This leads our Monte Carlo estimator to have
in¯nite variance [see Robert and Casella (2004)].
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